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Salary Compression Among University Faculty:  
A Review and Case Study of Remediation and Prevention in a 
Collective Bargaining Environment1 
 
Brent M. Graves2 and Dale Kapla3 
Literature Review 
The Problem 
Becker’s (1975) theory of specific human capital suggests that experience provides workers 
with knowledge and skills that are valuable to employers, so workers with greater seniority are 
worth more. Furthermore, current effort and performance may be encouraged by the promise of 
higher wages in the future (Lazear,1981). There are a variety of economic models that draw 
similar conclusions, such that it is widely accepted that wages should rise with seniority (Topel, 
1991). Some have suggested that this is not true for university faculty because faculty are 
attracted by non-monetary forms of compensation, leading to meager pay increases with 
seniority and resistance to pay differentials based on productivity or discipline (Bowen and 
Schuster, 1986; p 248-9; Hearn, 1999; Clark, 1987). 
However, a considerable positive correlation between seniority and pay among university 
faculty in most fields is generally well established (Barbezat, 2003). Work from the 1970’s found 
professional experience to be the most powerful factor in predicting salaries (Braskamp et al., 
1978; Hamovitch & Morgenstern, 1975). Across the 1980s, pay for professors was about two-
thirds higher than that of assistant professors (Bowen & Schuster, 1986; Scott & Bereman, 1992) 
and salary ratios across ranks remained steady through the mid-1990s (Hearn, 1999). Given the 
average years on the job between these ranks, such pay increases as a result of seniority in 
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academia are probably similar to those of United States workers in general, where ten years of 
seniority is worth about 25% in additional pay (Topel, 1991).  
Variation in faculty salaries may also result from disciplinary differences, and these began 
to grow in the 1980s as a result of an imbalance of supply and demand for faculty in certain 
fields. As salaries rose in high demand areas, budgets were balanced by restraining salaries for 
low demand areas. Thus, while the differences between average salaries at junior and senior 
ranks were constant from 1971 to 1987, the coefficient of variation increased (Hammermesh, 
1988). High-paid fields became higher and low-paid fields became lower. Scott and Bereman 
(1992) found a similar pattern at land grant institutions; much larger salary increases in business, 
computer science, and engineering than in education, fine arts, foreign languages, and letters. 
This pattern continued into the 1990s, with business, law, medicine, and engineering faculty 
rising faster than those in education, liberal arts, languages, and literatures (Hearn, 1999). The 
factors that influenced average faculty salaries across disciplines also affected salaries within 
disciplines.  
Competition for faculty in certain fields can result in relatively higher salaries for new 
hires. Funding for new faculty salaries may be obtained by limiting inflationary and promotion 
increases for current faculty. This reduces the effect of seniority on salary, resulting in a situation 
termed “salary compression” (e.g., Kassem, 1971). In extreme cases, the salaries of those with 
less seniority are greater than those with more, resulting in a pattern that has been termed “salary 
inversion” (Jennings & McLaughlin, 1997). We will refer to both patterns generically as “salary 
compression.” The first peer-reviewed journal article to examine this pattern in academia was 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin in 1987, although it was apparently already widely recognized and 
discussed. They state that “One can scarcely attend a professional meeting where this topic does 
not come up.” Blum (1989) suggested that salary compression became an issue in academia only 
in the 1980s. Many institutions have worked to identify and rectify salary compression, and this 
has produced an extensive literature on the topic. Regardless, it continues to be an issue 
(McDonald & Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017).  
Does salary compression exist in academia? The answer depends on many factors and 
various studies have produced sometimes conflicting results. Some researchers have found an 
absence of salary compression (Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a, 2004b; 
Toutkoushian, 1998; Seaman, 2005, 2007a; Yeh & Wang, 2012). Furthermore, there may be 
significant variation across disciplines and time (Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994; McDonald & 
Sorenson, 2017; Seaman, 2007b). Compression seems to be most prominent in a few rapidly 
growing fields, especially business (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1987; Hammermesh, 1988; Scott & 
Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994; Webster, 1995; Barbezat, 
2004a; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Toutkoushian, 1998; Bai et al., 2011; Murawski & King, 
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2011; Arnold et al., 2012; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017). Bratsberg et al. (2003) found strong 
salary compression among economics faculty after accounting for research, service and the fit of 
faculty to the university. Barbezat (2003) provides an excellent review of various factors that 
may be confounded with seniority, creating the appearance of salary compression or inversion 
where none exists.  
Methods for Detecting Salary Compression 
Salary equity studies became widespread as a result of The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act and the Equal Pay Act, both in 1972 (Barbezat, 2002). Seniority was often used as a factor in 
these salary models, leading to the detection of salary compression and inversion (Gordon et al., 
1974; Hoffman, 1976; McCulley & Downey, 1993; Barbezat, 2004a). Barbezat (2003) provides 
an excellent review of efforts to detect salary compression through about 2001. There have been 
two primary approaches to identifying salary compression: comparison of ratios of salaries at 
various ranks and multiple regression (Seaman, 2005). A few other techniques for identifying 
salary compression have seen limited use. These include stochastic dominance (Arnold et al., 
2012; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017), multiple objective programming (Sun, 2002) and 
calculation of a coefficient of inversion (Jennings & McLaughlin, 1997). 
Earlier studies of academic salary compression tended to rely on salary ratios (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1987; Barbezat, 2004a). National level data sets often lacked the detail 
necessary for regression analysis, and so were commonly analyzed by determining the ratios of 
salaries at various ranks or relative to some other benchmark (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988; 
Bereman & Lengnick, 1994; Midha et al., 2004; Seaman, 2005). Comparisons can be made both 
within and between institutions (Dworkin, 1990; Snyder et al., 1992). The problem with ratio 
data is that there is often no reference for how much difference between average salaries is 
appropriate (Toutkoushian, 1998). If a time series of data is available, narrowing of the gaps 
between average wages at various ranks can indicate salary compression (e.g., Hammermesh, 
1988; Scott & Bereman, 1992; Seaman, 2007b; Arnold et al., 2012; June, 2014; McDonald & 
Sorenson, 2017). A significant problem with this approach is that it ignores many confounding 
variables. These problems led to more widespread use of regression analysis. 
Regression analysis allows removal of salary variation due to a number of factors (e.g., 
highest degree, previous experience, administrative assignments, unionization, mobility, tenure, 
productivity, etc.) in order to isolate better the effects of seniority on salary. One of the earliest 
and best studies to identify salary compression used regression on national level data (Ransom, 
1993). However, many national level data sets lacked detail, so regression analyses were 
commonly based on data from one or a few institutions (e.g., McCulley & Downey, 1993; 
Hallock, 1995; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Moore et al., 1998). More detailed national data sets 
3
Graves and Kapla: Salary Compression Review and Case Study
Published by The Keep, 2018
that became available in the late 1980s made regression analysis more feasible (e.g., Barbezat & 
Donihue, 1998). A significant methodological improvement in the analysis of salary 
compression was presented by Toutkoushian (1998) who developed a five-step process for 
identifying salary compression, as well as the extent to which each faculty member’s salary 
differed from the expected salary in the absence of compression. Some regression analyses have 
found evidence of salary compression after controlling for confounding factors (Twigg et al., 
2002; Bratsberg et al., 2003; Yeh & Wang, 2012; Allen et al., 2015), while others have not 
(Toutkoushian, 1998; Barbezat, 2004b; Monks & Robinson, 2001; Seaman, 2007a). Sometimes, 
compression is found for certain disciplines, tenure statuses, or career stage, but not for others 
(Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a). Only a few studies have considered the effects of 
gender on salary compression (Hoffman, 1976; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Burke et al., 2005). 
Causes of Salary Compression 
Early examination of salary compression in nonacademic fields blamed the phenomenon on 
inflation, which drove up the salaries necessary to hire new employees. Lack of funds prevented 
comparable salary increases, plus increases for seniority, for ongoing employees (Kassem, 
1971). Although faculty salaries are clearly affected by inflation (Scott & Bereman, 1992), salary 
compression in academia is generally thought to be a result of low supply and high demand for 
faculty in certain disciplines, and the lack of funds to raise senior faculty salaries in a 
commensurate manner (McCulley & Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; Seaman, 
2007a).  
In contrast, some authors have suggested that salary compression is normal and may not be 
a problem (e.g., Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994). Economists separate human capital (what 
makes an employee valuable) that is accumulated with experience into general (not specific to an 
employer) and specific (valuable only to the current employer) (Becker, 1975). Faculty skills 
tend to be of the former type, allowing faculty to easily move between universities. If faculty can 
obtain higher salaries by moving to a different university, then it is likely that the best faculty 
will move, while low performers will stay (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1987). As a result, low 
performers with low pay will have high seniority and higher performers with high pay will have 
low seniority, especially in disciplines with a shortage of faculty (Ransom, 1993; Brown & 
Woodbury, 1998; Monks & Robinson, 2001). 
It is thought that university faculty are in a unique situation with regard to economic factors 
affecting salaries. Tenure and the distance between academic institutions make it especially 
costly for faculty to change employers. Thus, administrations have less need to increase pay with 
seniority in order to retain faculty. This has been termed “monopsony power” (Ransom, 1993; 
Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Siow, 1998). Hallock (1995) argued 
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against monopsony effects on faculty salaries. He suggested that findings from his study may 
have reflected collective bargaining that institutionalized salary dispersion, as well as an urban 
environment that made it relatively easy to change universities. Faculty who stay at relatively 
low pay may have little incentive to maintain high productivity, thus creating justification for the 
low pay (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat, 2003). However, Ransom (1993) found that productivity 
did not decrease with seniority.  
Salary compression may be greater at research universities (Ransom, 1993; Brown & 
Woodbury, 1998; Glandon & Glandon, 2001; Allen et al., 2015), although another study found 
more compression in mid-sized universities (Hoffman, 1997). Unionization may decrease 
compression (Barbezat, 1989; Hallock, 1995; Hoffman, 1997), although another study found no 
effect of union representation on salary compression (Martinello, 2009). It is even possible that 
higher-ranked faculty tend to have higher salaries with collective bargaining than without, 
because collective bargaining agreements are almost invariably negotiated by senior faculty. 
Effects of Salary Compression 
Salary compression is not necessarily a problem (Snyder et al., 1992). But in general, there 
is concern about salary compression because of its potential for negative effects on individual, 
and hence institutional, effectiveness. Almost all authors have cited low morale, and 
consequently poor performance, as results of salary compression (Kassem, 1971; Gomez-Mejia 
& Balkin, 1987; Blum, 1989; Scott & Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Jennings & 
McLaughlin, 1997; Seaman, 2007a). Glassman and McAfee (2005) argue that such salary 
inequities are unethical, with resulting negative effects on university culture. Alternatively, some 
have argued that flat salary structures promote collegiality, cooperation, and commitment 
(Lazear, 1981). There is an extensive literature regarding these contrasting perspectives in the 
context of corporations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014), but they have rarely been examined 
empirically in academia. However, Pfeffer and Langton (1988) found that compressed salaries in 
academic departments were associated with more social and democratic interactions. The same 
authors in a later study (1993) found that salary compression was positively correlated with 
productivity, satisfaction, and collaboration among faculty.  
When salaries of new hires are higher than those of more senior employees, there is 
incentive for employees to move to a new employer (Amey & VanDerLinden, 2002; Seaman, 
2007a). The cost of remaining with an employer has been termed a “loyalty tax” (Blum, 1989; 
Barbezat, 2004a). Resulting turnover is detrimental due to loss of human capital, hiring costs, 
and training costs for new employees. It is interesting that this hypothesis has received little 
empirical attention. One study concluded that salary compression has decreased faculty retention 
in pharmacy (Murawski & King, 2011). Another found no correlation in business schools 
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(Glandon & Glandon, 2001) and a third found that greater pay dispersion among college 
administrators led to higher turnover of lower paid individuals (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992). 
Employees who are dissatisfied with salary structures may find an alternative remedy in the 
courts. More senior employees are generally of greater chronological age, providing an 
opportunity to challenge salary inversion on the basis of age discrimination. These have not been 
successful (Mooney, 1991; O’Boyle, 2001; Euben, 2003). 
Responses to Salary Compression 
Once a university has determined that salary compression exists, it must decide what to do 
about it. Some argue that salary compression is not a problem and may simply reflect the value 
of faculty at various levels of seniority with regard to productivity (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat, 
2004a) or market forces (Euben, 2003), or that flat salary structures promote cooperation and 
productivity (Bowen & Shuster, 1986; Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993; Lazear, 1981). Still, there 
is widespread agreement that salaries should rise with seniority (Becker, 1975; Topel, 1991), so 
it is common for institutions to attempt to restore this correlation. The problem has been 
recognized in academia for decades, and it does not seem to be going away (Boggs, 2015; 
Flaherty, 2016; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017). As stated in the seminal work by 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1987) “Identifying pay compression, its causes, and its effects is a far 
simpler task than devising ways in which universities, or other employers, can deal with the 
problems that such a condition creates.” Consequently, the literature on the latter is far less 
extensive than the former. 
A number of strategies have been suggested to prevent salary compression from occurring. 
Lillydahl and Singell (1992) note that, while salaries are often positively correlated with research 
productivity, teaching quality is not similarly rewarded. They suggest that if it were, late-career 
faculty who concentrate more on teaching than research might not have compressed salaries. 
Although we have not found this suggestion in the literature, it is possible that greater value 
might be placed on service. It is possible that senior faculty are more valuable, not because they 
produce more scholarship, but for the same reason that administrators are more valuable; they 
have knowledge and experience that allows them to wisely contribute to shared governance of 
the university. If this were recognized in performance evaluations, then merit raises might 
alleviate salary compression. It may be possible to balance lower salaries of senior faculty with 
non-monetary compensation. These might include first pick of paid tasks such as consulting or 
additional teaching assignments, better offices, and more convenient schedules (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1987; Glassman & McAfee, 2005). Snyder et al. (1992) surveyed provosts who 
suggested increasing raises associated with promotions, setting salary minimums, and promoting 
more rapidly. 
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Universities also commonly attempt to correct for salary compression by identifying 
individual faculty with unjustifiably low salaries, followed by calculation of the salary increase 
required to rectify the problem. There are difficulties with this post-hoc approach. One must find 
the necessary money, and lack of funds was probably the primary cause of the problem in the 
first place. Further, it is a temporary solution that must be repeated frequently if future salary 
compression is to be prevented.  
Most often, factors such as merit, rank, time in rank, longevity at the institution, and market 
conditions for each discipline are used to build a multiple regression model to predict salaries, 
and negative residuals are used as indicators of the degree to which individual salaries should be 
raised (Huseman et al., 1996). At Indiana State University, residuals from a multiple regression 
analysis were used to flag low paid faculty, who then argued their case for raises to departmental 
personnel committees (Lamb & Moates, 1999). Duncan et al. (2004) avoided penalizing high-
performing faculty for having high salaries by removing the effects of earlier merit raises before 
addressing equity. Similarly, Herzog (2008) developed a four-step process to address 
discrimination prior to equity and merit. Jennings and McLaughlin (1997) found that, out of five 
models for calculating salary compression corrections, none decreased compression best for all 
departments, or for various funding levels within departments.  
Methods other than regression are also used to calculate salary adjustments that correct 
compression. Rather than regression analysis, Stewart et al. (1996) used standard salary 
predictors to build a salary goal table for each rank and discipline. Richardson and Thomas 
(2013) recommended using an “equity-performance matrix” to merge compression and 
performance influences on salary adjustments. The University of Wisconsin Oshkosh combined 
productivity increases for full professors with internal equity adjustments based on regression 
and larger promotion salary raises (Flaherty, 2013). Although they note that differential salary 
increases are viewed with skepticism by most faculty union members, Blitz and Cross (2013) 
recommended balancing equity and market forces through the collective bargaining process. 
They reviewed collective bargaining agreements and describe how Eastern Illinois University 
avoided salary compression by changing promotion raises from a consistent dollar amount (a 
smaller percentage of higher salaries) to a consistent percent of base salary.  
Case Study 
It is widely accepted that salary compression in higher education results from competition 
for high-demand/low-supply faculty in certain disciplines. In order for a university to hire such 
individuals, they are offered high salaries, often higher than their more senior colleagues. This is 
compounded when cost of living and promotion raises are minimized in order to budget for high 
salaries of new hires (McCulley & Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; Seaman, 
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2007a). The causes of salary compression at Northern Michigan University (NMU) were quite 
different and previously undescribed in the literature. The solution, which is also unique, has 
been gradually devised across five contracts, and has resulted in both correction and prevention 
of salary compression. Contract negotiation was done by four-member teams. The faculty 
negotiation team received direction from a Contract Proposal Development Team that surveyed 
the faculty for important issues, as well as a Faculty Council that met with the negotiation team 
frequently to review proposals and progress. The negotiation team, however, had significant 
freedom to negotiate a tentative agreement, which ultimately required ratification by the 
bargaining unit prior to implementation. Similarly, the administration formed their own proposal 
team consisting of the associate provost, deans of colleges, several department heads and the 
provost. Several ideas and approaches are normally winnowed to just a few larger, more 
comprehensive proposals. Again, similar to the faculty negotiation team, the administration’s 
team normally consisted of four individuals with significant negotiation authority.  
Demographics 
NMU is an upper-Midwest public comprehensive university with an enrollment of roughly 
7,000 students. Its faculty are represented by two unions: the NMU Chapter of the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the Northern Michigan University Faculty 
Association (NMUFA) affiliated with the Michigan Association of Higher Education, Michigan 
Education Association, National Education Association. The former is the largest, with both 
part-time and full-time faculty numbering close to 400, while the latter represents around 20 full-
time only faculty. Thus, the AAUP faculty were chosen for this analysis, as its membership 
comprises about 90% of teaching faculty representing most of the academic programs in the 
university.  
Overview of the Problem 
Serious discussion of salary compression at NMU was initiated during contract 
negotiations between NMU administration and AAUP in 2003. Although, some authors have 
suggested establishment of salary minimums and salary increases for promotion as a remedy for 
salary compression (Snyder et al., 1992), these were the primary causes of compression at NMU. 
Negotiation notes from 2003 indicate that it was already clear that salary increases associated 
with promotion were only about one-quarter of the dollar gap between minimum salaries for all 
ranks. Consequently, even when faculty were hired well above the minimum for a rank, they 
almost always were increased to the minimum salary at the next rank. Additionally, for almost 
two decades, promotion amounts and salary minimums tended to increase each year at a percent 
value equal to the across-the-board (ATB) cost-of-living salary adjustment. Thus, even after 
promotion, salary minimums for each rank increased at the same rate as salaries of faculty 
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already in that rank, resulting in most faculty salaries falling within a narrow range near the rank 
minimum. The following is a summary of discussions and solutions resulting from 
labor/management contract negotiations that occurred at three-year intervals from 2003 through 
2015.  
The Beginning - 2003 
In the 2003 contract negotiation, AAUP proposed to address this problem by setting 
minimums for full professors that increased with seniority. In contrast, administration proposed 
that rank minimums should be held relatively constant, while across-the-board (ATB) increases 
moved more-senior faculty above the minimums. Either approach would alleviate compression, 
but the former would be more costly than the latter. No resolution or action was agreed upon, but 
language was inserted into the contract that required formation of a joint faculty/administration 
committee to study market factors, salary compression, and faculty compensation in the 
subsequent academic year, with the stipulation that the committee’s recommendations would be 
given serious consideration in the next contract negotiation. 
The salary compression committee’s final report was submitted May 24, 2005. They 
affirmed salary compression for associate and full professors based on a subjective identification 
of the narrow range of most salaries for each rank that were clustered around the minimum, 
regardless of seniority. Four systemic causes of compression were identified. First, while merit, 
equity, and enrollment incentives in addition to ATB salary increases had created some variation 
in salaries, these had not occurred for over a decade. Salary dispersion was then lost as faculty 
who had received such increases in the 1980s and 1990s retired. Second, contracts in the 1970s 
had specified salaries based on years in rank, as well as rank, but these were abandoned in favor 
of minimum salaries for ranks alone. From 1985 on, minimum salaries increased at the same 
percentages as ATB. Third, the impact of large differences between minimum salaries for faculty 
ranks (as explained in the previous paragraph) usually brought faculty to the same minimum 
level after promotion. Fourth, although market factors influenced initial salaries, promotion 
tended to erase these and there was no recurring market review that would maintain such 
differences. The committee recommended adjustments to salaries based on merit, seniority, and 
market to remedy compression. However, they noted that this would require acceptance from the 
bargaining unit of unequal raises, and that these would all be short-term solutions. They provided 
a number of long-term solutions that all revolved around differential increases to rank 
minimums, ATBs, and promotion amounts. 
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CUPA and Inversions - 2006 
During negotiation of the 2006 contract, administration proposed several interconnected 
strategies to address salary compression that were ultimately accepted. First, in addition to ATB 
increases, a market and seniority adjustment totaling 3.1% of total faculty salaries was 
distributed. Faculty received the highest of (a) the College and University Professional 
Association for Human Resources (CUPA-HR, or simply CUPA) disciplinary average, (b) rank 
minimum plus 0.6% for each year in rank (up to 6 years for assistant and associate professors 
and, 20 years for full professors), or (c) the individual’s previous year salary times 1.015. 
Although discipline-based variation in faculty salaries had existed for some time as a result of 
initial salary at the time of hire, the use of CUPA data was an explicit acknowledgement of 
market influences on salary. While not always popular in a collective bargaining environment, 
this was approved by the faculty via the contract ratification vote. Second, ATBs went up faster 
than rank minimums. A third strategy to combat salary compression was a large increase in 
promotion raises (almost five times the previous amount on average) that varied with an 
individual’s pre-promotion salary (a flat amount plus 3% of the previous salary). This allowed 
faculty with relatively high salaries to maintain that position after promotion, rather than simply 
going to the minimum for the next rank. 
It was recognized that these changes would create salary inversions. Therefore, it was 
agreed that a Faculty Salary Inversion Review Committee would be formed to consider these and 
recommend adjustments to the Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs. No guidelines 
for the committee were provided. The committee recommended that salary of faculty whose 
salaries were inverted by promotion of a colleague at the same rank and CUPA classification 
should be brought up to that of the promoted colleague, plus $100 for each year in rank. This 
resulted in salary adjustments for 12 faculty in five departments at a total cost of $20,864 to base 
salaries. This contract was the first in many years in which minimum salaries for each rank 
increased by a smaller percentage than the ATB percentage increase. 
Inversions are Corrected - 2009 
In the 2009 contract, the Salary Inversion Review Committee and its procedures were 
defined in a memorandum of understanding attached to the contract. Salary inversions were 
determined to occur when a newly promoted faculty member’s salary is greater than someone in 
the same CUPA Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code who was previously at that 
rank and the newly promoted faculty member does not have a justifiably high salary based on 
market or achievement. Such unusually high-value hires who were exempt from triggering salary 
inversions were to be identified at the time of hire. Faculty whose salaries were inverted based 
on this definition would have their salary adjusted in an amount equal to the difference in salaries 
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plus $100 for each year in rank up to five years. Minimum salaries at each rank again increased 
at a smaller percentage than the ATB increase percentage. 
Getting to Market - 2012 
Two steps were taken in the 2012 contract to alleviate salary compression. First, procedures 
for the Salary Inversion Review Committee were moved from an addendum to the 2009 contract 
into the main body of the 2012 contract, providing the perception of a more permanent 
component of the salary determination process.  Second, market and seniority issues were 
addressed with the dedication of 0.5% and 1.0%, respectively, of total faculty salary dedicated to 
the effort. Target salaries for each faculty member were calculated as market salary for CIP code 
and rank based on CUPA data at public institutions, plus a proportion of salary for fringe 
benefits, plus 1% of salary for each year in rank capped at 20 years for full professors and five 
years for all other ranks. Target salaries were multiplied by 1.25 for 12-month faculty and by 0.8 
for those without a terminal degree. Salary adjustments based on these calculations were capped 
at $4,000. Prior to these adjustments, salaries of 81 of 300 full-time faculty were under their 
target, while only five were under target after adjustment. Minimum salaries at each rank again 
increased at a smaller percentage than the ATB salary increase percentage. 
Initial Hire Salary - 2015 
The final component was negotiated in the 2015 contract. While annual and promotion 
increases were almost entirely dependent on contract specifications that were applied to all 
faculty equally, initial salaries were negotiated individually at the time of hire subject only to 
salary minimums for each rank. These then had a huge effect on base salary and raises (usually a 
percent of base salary) throughout a faculty member’s career. This difference was compounded 
because the salary differential between faculty who started with salaries higher than their peers 
gradually grew throughout a career. This problem is exacerbated because it is often suggested 
that negotiation of initial salaries can be biased as a function of gender (Porter et al., 2008; 
Freund et al., 2016). Specification of a formula for calculation of initial salary removes the 
potential for such bias and creates a justification for salary differentials throughout the faculty, in 
all disciplines and career stages. Initial salaries are determined by: contractually mandated salary 
minimums if these are higher than any of the following: (a) if there is another faculty member 
with the same CIP code and rank currently in the hiring department, initial salary will be the 
current faculty member’s salary minus 1% for each year in rank; (b) average CUPA salary for 
the CIP code and rank; (c) if there is no discipline and rank specific CUPA data, the most recent 
CUPA average for “All Disciplines and All Institutions Combined” times the CUPA market 
factor for the next highest rank. 
11
Graves and Kapla: Salary Compression Review and Case Study
Published by The Keep, 2018
Conclusions 
Our approach to correcting salary compression and preventing its recurrence has spanned 
five contracts and 15 years. Initial salaries are now set in a transparent, objective, and justifiable 
fashion that reflects market forces. This, in conjunction with the market and seniority 
adjustments of 2006 and 2012 have effectively eliminated the possibility of gender biased 
salaries. Nine years of increases in minimum salaries that were less than ATB increases or 
inflation have created a situation in which few faculty are hired at minimum salaries or promoted 
to minimum salaries. Furthermore, salary dispersion is maintained subsequent to promotion. 
When anomalies arise (i.e., salary inversions), they are identified and corrected in a consistent 
manner. Across the 11 years in which the Salary Inversion Review Committee has been active, 
the average number of faculty who have had salary adjustments due to inversion has been 7.6 per 
year and the dollar amount added to base salaries has averaged $15,007 per year.  
Problems with effective function of the salary inversion committee at this point in the 
evolution of our contract are that (a) inversions are triggered only by promotion, so that they can 
exist for several years, or indefinitely at the rank of professor, without being detected; and (b) 
inversions exist only within the same CIP code, the assignment of which falls under management 
rights; hence, faculty are sometimes dissatisfied with their CIP code. A negative effect of this 
approach has been that the salary structure is quite rigid. When college deans negotiate hiring 
conditions, there is no room for salary negotiation; initial salaries are simply defined by the 
contract. This can repel some candidates who expect to dicker and win. Similarly, if excellent 
faculty are courted by other universities, matching external offers could trigger salary inversions. 
This quandary could result in loss of some better faculty. Additionally, explicit acceptance of 
salary differentials among faculty who do the same work but are in different disciplines could 
create tension. However, this is something that faculty generally accept as necessary in order to 
hire talented colleagues. None of these potential problems has seemed to become significant. 
Overall, the cause of salary compression problems at NMU (large differences between rank 
salary minimums and ATB salary adjustments that were equal to changes in rank minimums) and 
their solutions (bringing faculty salaries to defined targets that take into account market and 
seniority, annual correction of salary inversions, and defined initial salaries) have been unique. 
Although there is widespread agreement in the literature that salaries should be positively 
correlated with seniority, there is not agreement on the degree of salary dispersion that best 
promotes university effectiveness. Dispersion of faculty salaries in higher education is influenced 
by factors such as type of university, discipline, rank, collective bargaining, and year, so 
regression analysis is generally accepted as the best method for detecting compression (though 
we did not use this method at NMU). Additionally, regression can indicate the degree of 
correction appropriate for individual faculty. But there is not agreement on what predictor 
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variables make the best models, and this is likely to differ among universities and even 
departments within a given university. Correction of salary compression takes money, but the 
real challenge is changing the factors that cause compression so that the process does not need to 
be repeated frequently. NMU’s approach to negate the systemic causes of compression was 
gradual (over a 15 year period and five contracts) and strongly reliant on shared governance 
throughout. It used market adjustments, consistent correction of salary inversions, and defined 
initial salaries to create a transparent and justifiable salary structure that precludes the worst 
forms of compression. 
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